Armed opposition in wartime Russia: the Russian Volunteer Corps

This article examines the conceptual and emblematic positioning of the Russian Volunteer Corps (RVC) within the context of current Russian opposition. Specifically, it explores the discursive stances the RVC adopts on issues related to the Russian statehood, resistance strategies to the regime, and the interests of the actors involved in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Guided by the topical matrix of public discourse on the Russian-Ukrainian war proposed by Galyamina (2024), the study assesses the RVC’s positioning on several fundamental issues: the disintegration versus preservation of the Russian Federation, military struggle versus a mixed approach of violent and non-violent protest, alignment with Russian versus Ukrainian interests, and the focus on ethnic versus civic Russian identity. Using qualitative content analysis of the RVC’s official communication, the article draws on primary data from June 2022 to August 2024 to explore how the organization frames these critical issues. The findings reveal that the political wing of the RVC does not establish an inclusive or comprehensive political platform, suggesting an ideologically selective opposition discourse. This analysis provides insight into the RVC’s role within broader Russian opposition movements and its influence on the political landscape of the ongoing conflict.

The Russian resort to hybrid warfare: from Peter the great to Gerasimov

Since the illegal Russian annexation of Crimea and the proxy war in the Donbas, the term hybrid warfare has gained significant traction. It has been used to describe Moscow’s asymmetric actions (as well as those of other state and non-state actors) and refers to the ability to combine military tools (both regular and irregular) with non-military and non-conventional instruments (diplomatic, political, economic, informational). Yet, by examining the history of Russian strategic thought and observing how Russia has conducted the conflicts in which it has been involved, one can discern a marked inclination toward the use of so-called hybrid tools that can be traced back at least to the time of Peter the Great. This demonstrates a certain rootedness of the idea that it is possible to exploit means and methods not strictly belonging to the military sphere – an approach that was also present during the Soviet era, despite the dogmatic refusal to broaden the concept of war to include non-military instruments. The major debate on the wars of the future that marked the two decades following the dissolution of the USSR allowed the Kremlin to develop such tools even more effectively.

Between ‘Qoretta’ and trenches: the 2020–2022 Tigray war, the Tigrayan Defense Forces, and 21st century mobile warfare

This paper presents a case study of the tactical and operational practices of the Tigrayan Defense Forces (TDF), in their conflict with the Ethiopian National Defense Forces and its allies throughout 2020–2022. The Tigray war has mostly been overlooked as an example of contemporary warfare, despite suggestions that this was the deadliest war of 2021–2022, pitting huge forces with great diversity in equipment and organization against each other. This paper combines a theoretical overview of paradigmatic approaches to warfare – conventional maneuver warfare, conventional mobile warfare, and classical guerilla warfare – with novel primary data on the warfare practices of the TDF. I propose that TDF showcase a highly contextualized type of warfare, akin to Mao’s ideas about conventional mobile warfare. Throughout major parts of the war, TDF fielded a highly organized force, capable of performing large-scale operations for territorial control, despite primarily drawing on unexperienced recruits and suffering from significant logistical constraints. TDF furthermore mixed operational and tactical concepts from all three approaches to warfare, with a penchant for mobile warfare. Compared to the much-researched approaches of maneuver warfare and guerilla warfare, TDF’s take on mobile warfare should be recognized as an important and overlooked facet of contemporary warfare.

Beyond the Predator paradigm: what the Iraq and Afghan wars did (and did not) tell us about emergent drone warfare

Few debates in strategic studies today are more intense than those over drones’ importance to contemporary warfare. From Ukraine War to conflict in Yemen, the utility of long endurance armed drones is under intense scrutiny. This article argues that these critiques are unsurprising and can be attributed in good part to excessive expectations generated by a paradigmatic version of drone warfare that emerged during the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Referred to here simply as the Predator paradigm, a sociotechnical vision of present and future warfare emerged, centering on the iconic US long endurance armed drone platforms of that period (first the medium altitude MQ-1 Predator and then its larger and more capable successor, the high altitude MQ-9 Reaper). Although there is little doubt that these systems were highly effective tactical instruments in these specific wars, the outsized attention given to them, then and since, created a vision of armed drones in future war that warrants correction.

Between military and political expedience: ‘machinery of Rule’ in the British Empire during the Interbellum

The Interbellum period was marked by heated debates among proponents of different legal regimes governing the colonial order across the British Empire in the years after the Great War. These discussions reflected theoretical and doctrinal tensions between military and civilian authorities over the boundaries of their respective responsibilities in this matter, as well as contradictions between international law and internal security within imperial context. The article examines shifts in the military class’s attitudes to the use of force in maintaining the Empire’s internal security after the Great War in the light of legal restrictions and new challenges to colonial rule, primarily those posed by national movements. The study focuses on the views of British army officials regarding the legal frameworks for crisis management in the colonies, including the objectives, tasks, and conditions for imposing martial law and/or emergency regimes. This research perspective offers a fresh lens on the evolution of administrative practices during the twilight years of the British Empire. The article outlines the distinctive features of Britain’s ‘imperial school’ of military thought, while emphasising the growing role of the armed forces alongside the declining utility of other instruments for preserving colonial rule in dependent territories.

The militarization of the South African Border War: South African Police & South African Defence Force operations in northern South West Africa (Namibia), 1965–1967

The South Africa’s Border War (1966–1989) is often described as the ‘Last Hot War of the Cold War’. However, no study has examined in detail the initial stages of this conflict, more especially the gradual militarization of operations along the border between northern South West Africa (SWA) (modern Namibia) and the Portuguese colony of Angola. Initially control of the border remained the responsibility of the South African Police (SAP) who patrolled the vast region in civilian soft-skinned vehicles. With the purchase by the South African Air Force of Alouette III helicopters from France in the 1960s, SAP leadership saw an opportunity to greatly increase their ability to control this large area of responsibility. After high level negotiations the South African Defence Force agreed to loan the SAP both helicopters, pilots and ground crews for utilisation in northern SWA. It was in this manner that the first members of the SADF found themselves working in what was ultimately to become the SADF operational area. This article, using primary documents from the South African Department of Defence Documentation Centre (Military Archives) seeks to track how the SADF through mission creep’ between 1965 to 1967 became inexplicably involved in northern SWA.

Info Ops: from World War I to the Twitter era edited by Ofer Fridman, Vitaly Kabernik, and Francesca Granelli, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner, 2022, 287 pages., $38.50 (hardcover), ISBN: 978-1-62637-995-4

Türkiye’s strategic ambiguity in the Russia-Ukraine war

Türkiye occupies a pivotal position in the Black Sea region, balancing its NATO commitments, economic interdependence with Russia, and complex relations with the European Union. Since the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war, Ankara has acted simultaneously as mediator and disruptor - brokering the Black Sea Grain Initiative and prisoner exchanges while refusing full alignment with Western sanctions on Russia. The energy interdependence with Russia highlights its deliberate efforts to preserve autonomy and maximize influence by manoeuvring between rival powers. This article argues that Türkiye’s foreign policy is best understood through the frameworks of strategic ambiguity and hedging theory. Buzan’s Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) provides a complementary perspective, situating Türkiye’s actions within the wider security dynamics of the Black Sea region.

From caliphate to confederalism: how ISIS and the PYD used gender to consolidate control in the Syrian Civil War

Recent literature emphasises that insurgent groups instrumentalise gender relations for strategic purposes. However, there is often a disconnect between how gender is wielded rhetorically, through propaganda, and how it plays out on the ground. I seek to explain this disconnect by examining the gendered organisations of the PYD and ISIS in the context of the Syrian Civil War between 2011-2018. In both cases, their propaganda and governance frameworks reflected images of a cohesive society unified by a singular gender ideology. However, in reality, gendered rebel-public interactions were often stratified along cultural, ethnic and political lines. I argue that such inconsistencies can be explained by the need to project an image of the insurgency that aligns with international expectations, whilst simultaneously appealing to goal-rational legitimacy vis a vis local populations.

The new total war: from child abduction to cyber attacks and drones to disinformation: Russia’s conflict with Ukraine and the West by Bob Seely, London, Biteback Publishing, 2025, 369 pp., index, £25.00 (hardcover), ISBN: 9781785909481