Academic–Practitioner “Divide” on Defections Michel Guérin: Walk-Ins: Ces Grands Espions de l'Histoire qui ont Fait Défection [ Great Spies of History Who Defected ] (Paris: Mareuil Éditions, 2024), 342 p., $20.42. Nigel West: Soviet & Nazi Defectors: Counter-Intelligence in WW2 and the Cold War (Barnsley, UK: Frontline Books, 2024), 264 p., $27.57

Russian Intelligence in Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia at the Outbreak of War in Ukraine

The authors describe and compare the steps taken by the counterintelligence services of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland aimed at Russian intelligence operations preceding and immediately following the outbreak of a full-scale war in Ukraine. Among the three countries, authorities of the Czech Republic (in cooperation with the British) already set specific action patterns in 2021, subsequently applied by many other European countries, including Poland, after 22 February 2022. The actions of the Slovak services were much more cautious, although they did the necessary minimum. A preliminary study of the case of Hungary and Austria gave a negative result, leading to the thesis that those countries’ services did not take more decisive action in response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine; on the contrary, Vienna and Budapest have thus consolidated their position as Russian spy hubs in Central and Eastern Europe. The authors also draw attention to the continuity in the actions of the Soviet and Russian services in Central and Eastern Europe, beginning with the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in September 1968. The text is based on available archival and online sources, literature on the subject, and media publications.

How to Recruit a Swede? Polish Military Intelligence and Failure of HUMINT in Cold War Sweden

Declassified Polish documents clearly show that recruitment efforts among Swedish citizens presented numerous challenges for the staff of the Polish intelligence residency, which, for several decades, was unable to recruit a high-ranking source with access to military information. When such an opportunity finally arose, Polish officers viewed the walk-in source as a provocation by Swedish counterintelligence and subsequently reported the matter to the Swedish police. The difficulties in recruiting Swedes led the residency to seek alternative ways of acquiring human sources. After many failures, it ultimately focused its human intelligence activities on Polish nationals or Swedes of Polish descent. The scale and nature of these intelligence activities were more modest than portrayed by the Swedish media.

Austria’s Eastern Trade through American Eyes: U.S. Trade Controls in Austria in the Early Cold War from an Intelligence Perspective

Between 1945 and 1955, Austria was divided into four occupation zones. In its zone of occupation, the USSR set up a planned economic enclave with its Soviet enterprises. The Soviets declared the trade of these companies to be military shipments. The U.S. authorities and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) saw a high risk of reexport of strategic goods financed by the Marshall Plan through the Soviet zone of occupation in Austria to socialist Central and Eastern Europe. So, the European Cooperation Administration, which provided a cover for CIA agents, carried out end-use checks on goods financed by the Marshall Plan. The Counter Intelligence Corps was also involved in gathering information about these goods. The Americans stopped some transit shipments. In May 1948, the Americans began good controls in Austria. They were institutionalized in autumn. After the State Treaty of 1955, Austria’s eastern trade remained of interest to the U.S. administration.

The Wagner Group: Paramilitary–Intelligence Nexus and Its Role in the War in Ukraine

The Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary organization often referred to as a private military company (PMC), was an important means of hybrid power projection by the Russian Federation. It was used for military operations in Russia’s “near abroad,” as well as on a global scale as a security export model to access diplomatic support and natural resources and to circumvent international sanctions. The PMC’s close ties to the military intelligence service GRU can be traced throughout the operations of the Wagner Group. This article portrays these links and the Wagner Group’s importance for Russia in the Middle East and Africa. Its nexus to the intelligence nexus can be found not only on a personal level but also on several operational and support levels. To conclude, the ongoing developments after Yevgeny Prigozhin’s attempted coup in the summer of 2023 are examined.

Polish Counterintelligence Operations Targeting U.S. Diplomatic Missions (1975–1989)

This article examines a counterintelligence operation by Polish security services during the Cold War aimed at infiltrating U.S. consulates in Cracow and Poznan. Collaborating with the Committee for State Security, Polish operatives employed advanced espionage techniques, including radioactive isotopes, to access classified documents. The study traces the operation’s origins and methodology, revealing its influence on Polish leader Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski’s strategic decisions. By analyzing declassified materials, the research highlights how the stolen documents shaped Jaruzelski’s perceptions of U.S. diplomatic assessments and affected his policymaking regarding Soviet and American relations, emphasizing the significant role of covert intelligence in political decisionmaking during the Cold War.

Cold War Whodunit Mostly Solved! Peter Gillman and Emmanuele Midolo: Murder in Cairo: The Killing of David Holden . Hull: Biteback Publishing, 2025. 487 pp. $31.33 (hardcover and e-book)

Entertainment Boogeyman? Francis MacDonnell: Policing Show Business: J. Edgar Hoover, the Hollywood Blacklist, and Cold War Movies , University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2024, 308 p., $37.61

Spies Unlike Us: The Making of the Stasi J. Boulter: First Class Comrades: The Stasi in the Cold War, 1945-1961 , Oldcastle Books, 2025, 736 pages, $82 (hard cover); $42.33 (paperback)

Persistence of International Renewable Commodity Prices: Accounting for the Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic and Russia–Ukraine War

In this article, we examine the statistical properties of 15 international renewable commodity prices by looking at the degree of persistence from January 1960 to March 2023. Moreover, we also explored if the incidence of the COVID-19 pandemic or Russia–Ukraine war caused a change in persistence or mean reversion of renewable commodity prices. The results suggest that all series are highly persistent, and evidence of mean reversion and transitory shocks are only obtained in some cases for bananas and tea. The COVID-19 pandemic or Russia–Ukraine war has not significantly affected the persistence of the series.