Journals
2026 EN
Spocter Manfred
The establishment and endurance of a learned society depend largely on its members. James Hutcheon’s idea of a learned geographical society in South Africa led to the establishment of the South African Geographical Society (SAGS) in July 1917. This research traces the history of the SAGS from when a geographical society was first mooted in 1914 through to its formation and up until 1923. It gives identity to the rank-and-file members who served on the inaugural Council and traces the rise and demise of membership numbers over the first seven years of the Society’s existence. Historical material at the National Archives and at various universities in South Africa and online archival material was a rich source of information. This was supplemented by factual and contextual information from published literature. The early years were marked by widespread interest in the Society on the Witwatersrand and growing appeal farther afield as membership numbers swelled. Schoolteachers and university students played important roles as councillors and biographical sketches serve to give recognition to these early foot soldiers of the discipline. Unfortunately, the aftermath of World War I, economic hardships, the demise of Society’s founder and the Rand Rebellion led to a decline in membership.
Journals
2026 EN
Hanau Santini Ruth
Securitisation and, more recently, de-securitisation, have characterised and shaped the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regional space. Examples of securitisation in the 2000s and 2010s include coercive policies adopted by Saudi and Emirati kingdoms against the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Yemen and Qatar, responding either to a sectarian (anti-Shia influence) or ideological (anti-political Islam) logic. In the post-2020 regional order, these regimes’ changing regional conceptions and threat perceptions have paved the way for new diplomatic agreements contributing to regional de-securitisation. Combining Regional Security Complex theory and liberal international political economy approaches, these political and spatial shifts are illustrated through process tracing and the analysis of key strategic documents produced by Saudi and Emirati kingdoms. The analysis points to how expectations of positive trade exchanges have reduced the propensity for conflict and have acted as a further incentive for fostering trade ties as a stabilisation tool. While the volatility of the region has seemingly spiked since the 2023-24 Gaza war, leading to conflict spillover and new processes of securitisation and exclusionary spatial politics, these do not offset the parallel processes of relational spatial politics and de-securitisation initiated by Sunni Gulf monarchies since the late 2010s.
Journals
2026 EN
Kumarasamy Ana
Since the end of the civil war (1975-89), Beirut has endured over 25 years of waste crises resulting from years of corruption and mismanagement. At the centre of this crisis lies the postwar power-sharing agreement which, through contested politics and competition, has led to the uneven distribution of waste hazards, marginalising vulnerable groups and destroying ecosystems. Discard studies provide a critical lens to unpack these dynamics by revealing the co-constructive processes of securitisation and spatialisation. Waste, in this context, highlights the silent, slow and violent aspects of securitisation relating to the politics of hazardous waste exposure, while also showing how these politics are spatially reproduced through the marginalisation and exclusion of communities living adjacent to Beirut’s coastal landfills. An analysis of the three levels of national security, human security and ecological security sheds light on how waste governance in postwar Beirut simultaneously protects political elites, deepens marginalisation and degrades urban ecosystems. Together, these insights demonstrate how the theoretical convergence between waste, security and space broadens our understanding of the environmental complexities in postwar urban environments.
Journals
2026 EN
Holesch Adam · Martill Benjamin
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked a critical juncture in European politics, transforming the EU’s institutional, geopolitical and normative orientation. While initial consensus among mainstream political actors was high, questions later arose about whether emerging war fatigue in Europe was reshaping the political landscape and leading to greater politicisation. In this article, we examine the differentiated impact which the increasing costs of the war have had on the extent of politicisation across varying national contexts. We examine conceptually the dynamics of consensus-building in multinational military coalitions, the potential effects of war fatigue, and the factors shaping whether politicisation results. We show how these dynamics have played out empirically, charting the politics of support for Ukraine from initial consensus on securitizing Russia towards a more complex picture characterized by increasing concerns about the costs of the war and the effectiveness of the European support.
Journals
2026 EN
Cladi Lorenzo
To what extent have war fatigue and politicisation impacted upon Italian foreign policy? Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi committed Italy to sending weapons to Kyiv and to condemning Putin’s actions after the intensification of the Russo-Ukrainian war in February 2022. Becoming Prime Minister in October 2022, Giorgia Meloni followed Draghi’s footsteps. This article argues that Draghi and Meloni sought to use the pro-Ukraine stance to elevate their profiles internationally and to make sure Italy would continue to be a reliable ally in NATO and the EU. Both Draghi and Meloni dealt with parties in their own coalitions that advanced a contrarian view of the government line. Draghi and Meloni strove to assert their leadership domestically and internationally. However, their political fortunes differed due to the strength of their governing coalitions and their ability to play the Ukraine card to manage domestic political divisions.
Journals
2026 EN
Hofmann Stephanie C.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s war in Gaza have demonstrated that partisan politics and polarization dynamics in Europe can, but do not necessarily, stop at the water’s edge. Threat perception and political ties to foreign actors, for example, influence how the EU and its member-states debate whether and how to intervene in international events and engage with external powers. In this conclusion, I build on the contributions of the special issue to assess when heightened polarization and new cleavages are likely to emerge, and when a more unified front can be expected. I also use these contributions to argue for moving beyond the water’s edge not only theoretically but also interdisciplinarily. Conceptual and theoretical translations across Comparative Politics, International Relations, Public Policy and Administration, Political and Social Psychology, and Foreign Policy Analysis helps us tap into the realities of European security and defence politics.
Journals
2026 EN
Martill Benjamin
Why has assistance to Ukraine become politically contentious in some countries more than others? Much attention has been paid to the role of populist opposition parties in seeking to politicise the issue, especially as citizens have become less willing to bear the costs involved. But not all populist actors have challenged Ukraine policy in this way. This article argues that the decision to politicise depends on the extent of previous co-optation to the liberal mainstream position prior to the onset of war fatigue. Looking empirically at the cases of Poland and the United Kingdom, it shows how populist presence in government at the time of Russia’s invasion incentivised these parties to articulate a pro-assistance line which reduced their subsequent ability to politicise the issue at a later date. The findings help us understand how distinct sources of politicisation interact and highlight the importance of sequencing and other temporal considerations.
Journals
2026 EN
Wondreys Jakub · March Luke
We provide a comparative analysis of how European radical left parties (RLPs) politicise the Israel – Palestine and Russia – Ukraine conflicts. Examining the positions of 25 RLPs, we test four hypotheses examining variation in Israel-hostility, Russia-related stances, cross-conflict coherence, and the dynamics of war fatigue. Patterns of politicisation are complex and there is no unified party family response. We show that while no RLP is Israel-friendly, levels of Israel-hostility vary substantially and tend to intensify as the Gaza war persists. By contrast, positions on Russia – Ukraine remain deeply divided, with no linear shift towards Russia-friendliness. Ideological subtype shapes, but does not determine, party responses, while broader contextual factors, most notably the ‘Trump effect’, repoliticise questions of European security. However, further politicisation is limited by the weakness of cross-conflict coherence. Several parties express consistent anti-imperialist logic in their response, but most disaggregate their critiques. RLP foreign policy emerges as ideologically-driven but contextually responsive.
Journals
2026 EN
Cadier David
This article argues that anti-populism, in itself and in its dialogical interaction with populism, feeds the politicisation of foreign policy. Anti-populism inverts but mirrors the populist logics of differentiation, legitimation, and mobilisation, and as such translates in a similar proclivity to use foreign policy as a terrain to attack and mark a difference with political adversaries. In testing and illustrating this argument, this article analyses how the Russia-Ukraine war has featured in the anti-populist strategies of governing parties in Czechia and France. In both countries, patterns of anti-populist politicisation have preceded dynamics of populist politicisation and were articulated in support of opposite policy options: anti-populist politicisation backed economic and military aid to Ukraine while populist politicisation, seeking to capitalise on war fatigue politically, criticised its extent. Overall, the choreography between populist and anti-populist politicisation contributes to redefine the link between politics and policy.
Journals
2026 EN
Rogers Lauren · Christou Andrea
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine precipitated a renegotiation of the militarily non-aligned states of the EU and challenged the moral underpinnings of conflict politics in other states. In Germany and Ireland, two countries that ultimately took different paths on the decision to arm Ukraine, the narrative of ‘moral’ duty in Europe has been especially pronounced. This paper analyses how German and Irish political actors used ‘morality’ in two country-wide efforts to discuss the future of national security politics: the ‘Zeitenwende on Tour’ town halls from 2022–2024 and the Consultative Forum on International Security Policy in 2023. These fora provided opportunities for political elites to frame the arming question as moral or immoral while including immediate feedback from constituents. In analysing how German and Irish leaders and opposition speak about weapons, conflict, and moral obligation, we demonstrate that this war has led to a politicisation of morality itself.