: The design, prototype implementation, and demonstration of an ethical governor capable of restricting lethal action of an autonomous system in a manner consistent with the Laws of War and Rules of Engagement is presented.
: Even before the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008, U.S.-Russian relations were reaching an impasse. Matters have only grown worse since then as Washington has stopped all bilateral military cooperation with Moscow, and it is difficult to imagine either Washington or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) entering into arms control talks with Russia before the end of the George W. Bush administration. Indeed, as of September 2008, the administration is contemplating not just a break in arms talks but actual sanctions, and has allowed the bilateral civil nuclear treaty with Russia to die in the Senate rather than go forward for confirmation. U.S. Ambassador to Russia John Beyerle recently admitted that this is not a propitious time for bilateral nuclear cooperation and explicitly tied its resumption to Russian policy in Georgia. Similarly, Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) and former Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), who authored the Comprehensive Threat Reduction Program (CTR) to ensure the removal of unsafe nuclear materials and weapons from Russian arsenals, have expressed their concern that continuation of this vital program may now be in danger due to the deterioration in Russo- American relations. But those are by no means the only reasons for concern regarding the arms control agenda. Since August 8 when the war broke out, the following developments on both sides have further hardened positions and raised tensions apart from the war itself and Russia?s quite evident refusal to abide by its own cease-fire terms.c
: Peace is a word that is often used but vaguely understood. Conventional thought considers peace as a condition that shares a dialectical relationship with war, albeit devoid of a separate nature of its own. Upon closer examination peace has a pragmatic quality to it as well as the potential to be a separate element of statecraft, not simply the absence, termination, or continuation of war. This paper examines peace at the individual, collective, and intercollective levels. It does so by addressing three central questions. First, how is peace defined and what is its nature? Is it a natural condition or an artificially constructed one? Second, does it differ at the individual, collective, and intercollective levels. And third, can peace stand on its own as a means of policy relative to diplomacy and war? In essence, can peace be waged? Research reveals that a complex paradigmatic change in statecraft must occur to employ peace as a "shaping" and sustaining action. The author believes further inquiry is required to fully understand its potential as a tool, one that is similar to "soft power." At the conclusion of the paper, he offers recommendations for the continued development of this concept.
: While all warfare is an expression of politics, none is more pervasively so than irregular conflict. The irregular side, most probably employing a mixture of guerilla tactics and terrorism, will seek favorable political effect from several courses of action. Combating terrorism has become a global effort. Counterterrorism is a struggle of political wills, waged preeminently by the police and other security services, with the military acting in reserve. The most important weapon for the counter-terrorist is information. The war of ideas is crucial to today's terrorist, guerilla, and insurgent. Two of major terrorist organizations that pose the greatest potential threat to the United States are Al Qaeda and Hezbollah; both are motivated by two very powerful yet distinct ideologies.
: In the wake of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, one of the most intensely debated issues concerning the conduct of the war has been the level of troops committed to the effort. Military observers, policy makers, military officers, and media pundits have discussed this issue obsessively. This monograph uses this debate and current operations as the impetus to further examine the force levels required for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Although the US military has a long history of executing "small wars," the intellectual effort to capture, refine, and codify lessons and guidance on the subject of COIN has been insufficient until the publishing of FM 3-24 in 2006. Even this manual, however, lacks the level of analysis planners require to accurately determine the force levels for a given environment. Therefore, the purpose of this work is to analyze the relevant force density theories against case studies to provide a comprehensive analysis of the critical qualitative and quantitative factors in determining a valid force size for conducting COIN operations in a given environment. To determine a historical gauge for planning force levels in a COIN environment, this study provides a quantitative and qualitative analysis of two successful COIN case studies, the British-led Malaya Emergency and the US-led Operation in Iraq. Quantitative analysis of the case studies is used to compare the security force size employed to the population size. The qualitative analysis of the case studies is used to identify and assess the implications of specific operational environment factors on the force density used. Through applying a holistic approach of both quantitative and qualitative analysis, planners can more accurately determine the force density to meet the needs of a specific situation.
: High energy laser (HEL) weapons are some of most challenging military applications in the future battle fields since the speed of light delivery enables the war fighter to engage very distant targets immediately. The issues of the technology on the HEL system include various types of high energy laser devices, beam control systems, atmospheric propagation, and target lethality. Among them, precision pointing of laser beam and high-bandwidth rejection of jitters produced by platform vibrations are one of the key technologies for the emerging fields of laser communications and HEL systems. HEL testbed has been developed to support the research environments on the precision beam control technology including acquisition, tracking, and pointing. The testbed incorporates optical table, two axis gimbal, high speed computers, and a variety of servo components, sensors, optical components, and software. In this report, system configuration and operation modes of the testbed are briefly introduced. The results of the experiments and integrated modeling from component to system level are described and discussed. Based on these results, new control algorithms are designed and it is shown that the algorithm can improve the pointing performance of the system.
: The US military has been recruiting foreigners to serve in its military forces since the country was first formed. Prior to the Civil War, about half of those serving in the US military were immigrants. During the Civil War, 1 in 5 Union soldiers was an immigrant; and today, of the 65,000 foreign-born men and women serving in the US military, approximately 29,000 are noncitizens (green card holders). While these legal immigrants are allowed to serve in the US military, undocumented/illegal immigrants are not allowed to serve. Nevertheless, undocumented/illegal immigrants should be allowed to enlist in the US military because doing so would ease the current difficulties in recruiting an all-volunteer force, many of these individuals already possess the qualities needed for military service, and the trend in current and proposed legislation is moving toward allowing both illegal immigrants and foreigners to enlist.
: There is a vast literature on the potential for new technologies to create a Revolution in Military Affairs or "networked warfare," but that is a discussion of the impact of military technology on the way the force itself can be used. Today there is a question regarding the impact of new communication and information technologies in the hands of civilians--some of whom are combatants--on the environment in which the force will be used. This monograph argues that the impact of these technologies has been, and will be, great enough that the way they are shaping the battlefield needs to be understood. Waging war against terrorists (or insurgents using a terrorist playbook) is a qualitatively different enterprise from earlier wars. By definition, terrorists are too weak to fight successful conventional battles. They fight to shape the perceptions and attitudes of the public--a battle over the public's will to continue fighting, whether that is the indigenous public insurgents seek to intimidate or the domestic American public they seek to influence so as to force counterinsurgents to withdraw from the battlefield prematurely. And in the modern world, this will be a battle to shape media coverage.
The US military has made considerable progress in developing counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy and doctrine, including the publication of Army Field Manual 3-24 and the military's successes in working with the population to stem the insurgency in Iraq. The short-term goals of COIN are now fairly well understood: engage the population and win their support. Whichever side wins the support of the population--either the host nation (and US forces that support it) or the insurgents--wins the battle. The battle is not the war, however. The long-term goal of a counterinsurgency campaign requires the creation of a functioning state, a government that can stand on its own, provide for its citizens, and promote regional and international stability; this achievement is victory in a counterinsurgency. Transitioning from the short-term success of population engagement to long-term viability of the host nation is far more difficult and less understood. It is important for the military to understand the long-term goals of counterinsurgency in order to take the appropriate measures in the near-term that support the objective of creating a functional state. To that end, this article outlines three analytical stages to achieve victory in COIN: population engagement, stability operations, and the creation of a functioning state. It contends that actions taken in the early stages of COIN should always keep in perspective the long-term goal of creating a viable state. Without this foresight, actions taken in the short-term may undermine the stability of the state and result in defeat. Stage 1: Population Engagement Most scholars agree that insurgency is a form of political violence that aims to challenge the existing authority in a state, be it the government or an occupying force. Insurgent violence, in other words, is not random violence but violence with a greater purpose. French insurgency expert David Galula defines an insurgency as "a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives, leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order." (1) The US Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual echoes this definition, describing insurgency as "an organized, protracted, politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control." (2) Unlike conventional wars, where one military aims to defeat another on the battlefield, the center of gravity in insurgencies is the population. (3) In other words, the battle between insurgents and the state is a tug-of-war for the loyalty and support of the population. Galula contends: If the insurgent manages to dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent [the government], to control it physically, to get its active support, he will win the war because, in the final analysis, the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness. (4) Without the population's support, insurgents cannot survive. Likewise, without the population's support, a state's government lacks legitimacy and is unlikely to survive. A successful counterinsurgency strategy requires winning the population away from insurgents by drawing on a mixture of kinetic and nonkinetic actions. Finding the balance between kinetic and nonkinetic operations is perhaps the greatest challenge in the early stages of a counterinsurgency. (5) If the goal is to build rapport with the population and win their trust, then kinetic operations alone are unlikely to achieve this end. If the population and insurgents are intertwined, as they usually are in the early stages of COIN, then kinetic operations run the risk of collateral damage to the individuals and infrastructure, which will cause a loss of trust and support. …
Tese de Mestrado "Master of Military Operational Art and Science", Air Command And Staff College, Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama